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Main article: "Management information base
SNMP agents expose management data on the managed systems as variables. The protocol also permits active management tasks, such as modifying and applying a new configuration through remote modification of these variables. The variables accessible via SNMP are organized in hierarchies. SNMP itself does not define which information (which variables) a managed system should offer. Rather, SNMP uses an extensible design which allows applications to define their own hierarchies and metadata. These hierarchies, and other metadata (such as type and description of the variable), are described by management information bases (MIBs). MIBs describe the structure of the management data of a device subsystem; they use a "hierarchical namespace containing "object identifiers (OID). Each OID identifies a variable that can be read or set via SNMP. MIBs use the notation defined by "Structure of Management Information Version 2.0 (SMIv2, "RFC 2578), a subset of "ASN.1.
SNMP operates in the "Application Layer of the "Internet Protocol Suite ("Layer 7 of the "OSI model). The SNMP agent receives requests on "UDP port 161. The manager may send requests from any available source port to port 161 in the agent. The agent response will be sent back to the source port on the manager. The manager receives notifications (Traps and InformRequests) on port 162. The agent may generate notifications from any available port. When used with "Transport Layer Security or "Datagram Transport Layer Security requests are received on port 10161 and traps are sent to port 10162.
SNMPv1 specifies five core "protocol data units (PDUs). Two other PDUs, GetBulkRequest and InformRequest were added in SNMPv2 and the Report PDU was added in SNMPv3.
All SNMP PDUs are constructed as follows:
The seven SNMP protocol data unit (PDU) types are as follows:
- A manager-to-agent request to retrieve the value of a variable or list of variables. Desired variables are specified in variable bindings (values are not used). Retrieval of the specified variable values is to be done as an "atomic operation by the agent. A Response with current values is returned.
- A manager-to-agent request to change the value of a variable or list of variables. Variable bindings are specified in the body of the request. Changes to all specified variables are to be made as an atomic operation by the agent. A Response with (current) new values for the variables is returned.
- A manager-to-agent request to discover available variables and their values. Returns a Response with variable binding for the "lexicographically next variable in the MIB. The entire MIB of an agent can be walked by iterative application of GetNextRequest starting at OID 0. Rows of a table can be read by specifying column OIDs in the variable bindings of the request.
- Optimized version of GetNextRequest. A manager-to-agent request for multiple iterations of GetNextRequest. Returns a Response with multiple variable bindings walked from the variable binding or bindings in the request. PDU specific non-repeaters and max-repetitions fields are used to control response behavior. GetBulkRequest was introduced in SNMPv2.
- Returns variable bindings and acknowledgement from agent to manager for GetRequest, SetRequest, GetNextRequest, GetBulkRequest and InformRequest. Error reporting is provided by error-status and error-index fields. Although it was used as a response to both gets and sets, this PDU was called GetResponse in SNMPv1.
- Asynchronous notification from agent to manager. SNMP traps enable an agent to notify the management station of significant events by way of an unsolicited SNMP message. Includes current sysUpTime value, an OID identifying the type of trap and optional variable bindings. Destination addressing for traps is determined in an application-specific manner typically through trap configuration variables in the MIB. The format of the trap message was changed in SNMPv2 and the PDU was renamed SNMPv2-Trap. While in classic communication the client always actively requests information from the server, SNMP allows the additional use of so-called "traps". These are data packages that are sent from the SNMP server to the client without being explicitly requested.
- Acknowledged asynchronous notification. This PDU was introduced in SNMPv2 and was originally defined as manager to manager communication. Later implementations have loosened the original definition to allow agent to manager communications. Manager-to-manager notifications were already possible in SNMPv1 (using a Trap), but as SNMP commonly runs over UDP where delivery is not assured and dropped packets are not reported, delivery of a Trap was not guaranteed. InformRequest fixes this by sending back an acknowledgement on receipt.
Development and usage
SNMP version 1 (SNMPv1) is the initial implementation of the SNMP protocol. SNMPv1 operates over protocols such as User Datagram Protocol (UDP), Internet Protocol (IP), OSI Connectionless Network Service (CLNS), AppleTalk Datagram-Delivery Protocol (DDP), and Novell Internet Packet Exchange (IPX). SNMPv1 is widely used and is the "de facto network-management protocol in the Internet community.
The first "Requests for Comments (RFC)s for SNMP, now known as SNMPv1, appeared in 1988:
- "RFC 1065 — Structure and identification of management information for TCP/IP-based internets
- "RFC 1066 — Management information base for network management of TCP/IP-based internets
- "RFC 1067 — A simple network management protocol
These protocols were obsoleted by:
- "RFC 1155 — Structure and identification of management information for TCP/IP-based internets
- "RFC 1156 — Management information base for network management of TCP/IP-based internets
- "RFC 1157 — A simple network management protocol
After a short time, "RFC 1156 (MIB-1) was replaced by the more often used:
- "RFC 1213 — Version 2 of management information base (MIB-2) for network management of TCP/IP-based internets
Version 1 has been criticized for its poor security. Authentication of clients is performed only by a "community string", in effect a type of password, which is transmitted in cleartext. The '80s design of SNMPv1 was done by a group of collaborators who viewed the officially sponsored OSI/IETF/NSF (National Science Foundation) effort (HEMS/CMIS/CMIP) as both unimplementable in the computing platforms of the time as well as potentially unworkable. SNMP was approved based on a belief that it was an interim protocol needed for taking steps towards large scale deployment of the Internet and its commercialization. In that time period Internet-standard authentication/security was both a dream and discouraged by focused protocol design groups.
SNMPv2 ("RFC 1441–"RFC 1452), revises version 1 and includes improvements in the areas of performance, security, confidentiality, and manager-to-manager communications. It introduced GetBulkRequest, an alternative to iterative GetNextRequests for retrieving large amounts of management data in a single request. However, the new party-based security system in SNMPv2, viewed by many as overly complex, was not widely accepted. This version of SNMP reached the Proposed Standard level of maturity, but was deemed obsoleted by later versions.
Community-Based Simple Network Management Protocol version 2, or SNMPv2c, is defined in "RFC 1901–"RFC 1908. SNMPv2c comprises SNMPv2 without the controversial new SNMP v2 security model, using instead the simple community-based security scheme of SNMPv1. This version is one of relatively few standards to meet the IETF's Draft Standard maturity level, and was widely considered the "de facto SNMPv2 standard. It too was later obsoleted, by SNMPv3.
User-Based Simple Network Management Protocol version 2, or SNMPv2u, is defined in "RFC 1909–"RFC 1910. This is a compromise that attempts to offer greater security than SNMPv1, but without incurring the high complexity of SNMPv2. A variant of this was commercialized as SNMP v2*, and the mechanism was eventually adopted as one of two security frameworks in SNMP v3.
SNMPv1 & SNMPv2c interoperability
As presently specified, SNMPv2c is incompatible with SNMPv1 in two key areas: message formats and protocol operations. SNMPv2c messages use different header and protocol data unit (PDU) formats from SNMPv1 messages. SNMPv2c also uses two protocol operations that are not specified in SNMPv1. Furthermore, "RFC 2576 defines two possible SNMPv1/v2c coexistence strategies: proxy agents and bilingual network-management systems.
An SNMPv2 agent can act as a proxy agent on behalf of SNMPv1 managed devices, as follows:
- An SNMPv2 NMS issues a command intended for an SNMPv1 agent.
- The NMS sends the SNMP message to the SNMPv2 proxy agent.
- The proxy agent forwards
Set messages to the SNMPv1 agent unchanged.
- GetBulk messages are converted by the proxy agent to
GetNext messages and then are forwarded to the SNMPv1 agent.
The proxy agent maps SNMPv1 trap messages to SNMPv2 trap messages and then forwards them to the NMS.
Bilingual network-management system
Bilingual SNMPv2 network-management systems support both SNMPv1 and SNMPv2. To support this dual-management environment, a management application in the bilingual NMS must contact an agent. The NMS then examines information stored in a local database to determine whether the agent supports SNMPv1 or SNMPv2. Based on the information in the database, the NMS communicates with the agent using the appropriate version of SNMP.
Although SNMPv3 makes no changes to the protocol aside from the addition of cryptographic security, it looks much different due to new textual conventions, concepts, and terminology.
SNMPv3 primarily added security and remote configuration enhancements to SNMP. Due to lack of security with the use of SNMP, network administrators were using other means, such as telnet for configuration, accounting, and fault management.
SNMPv3 addresses issues related to the large-scale deployment of SNMP, accounting, and fault management. Currently, SNMP is predominantly used for monitoring and performance management.
SNMPv3 defines a secure version of SNMP and also facilitates remote configuration of the SNMP entities.
SNMPv3 provides a secure environment for the management of systems covering the following:
- Identification of SNMP entities to facilitate communication only between known SNMP entities - Each SNMP entity has an identifier called the SNMPEngineID, and SNMP communication is possible only if an SNMP entity knows the identity of its peer. Traps and Notifications are exceptions to this rule.
- Support for security models - A security model may define the security policy within an administrative domain or an intranet. SNMPv3 contains the specifications for USM (User-based Security Model).
- Definition of security goals where the goals of message authentication service include protection against the following:
- Modification of Information - Protection against some unauthorized SNMP entity altering in-transit messages generated by an authorized principal.
- Masquerade - Protection against attempting management operations not authorized for some principal by assuming the identity of another principal that has the appropriate authorizations.
- Message Stream Modification - Protection against messages getting maliciously re-ordered, delayed, or replayed to effect unauthorized management operations.
- Disclosure - Protection against eavesdropping on the exchanges between SNMP engines.
- Specification for USM - USM (User-based Security Model) consists of the general definition of the following communication mechanisms available:
- Communication without authentication and privacy (NoAuthNoPriv).
- Communication with authentication and without privacy (AuthNoPriv).
- Communication with authentication and privacy (AuthPriv).
- Definition of different authentication and privacy protocols - Currently, the MD5 and SHA authentication protocols and the CBC_DES and CFB_AES_128 privacy protocols are supported in the USM. Operations and Management Area Working Group (OpsAWG) of IETF is currently (March 2015) advancing HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols for USM.
- Definition of a discovery procedure - To find the SNMPEngineID of an SNMP entity for a given transport address and transport endpoint address.
- Definition of the time synchronization procedure - To facilitate authenticated communication between the SNMP entities.
- Definition of the SNMP framework MIB - To facilitate remote configuration and administration of the SNMP entity.
- Definition of the USM MIBs - To facilitate remote configuration and administration of the security module.
- Definition of the VACM MIBs - To facilitate remote configuration and administration of the access control module.
SNMPv3 focuses on two main aspects, namely security and administration. The security aspect is addressed by offering both strong authentication and data encryption for privacy. The administration aspect is focused on two parts, namely notification originators and proxy forwarders.
SNMPv3 defines a number of security-related capabilities. The initial specifications defined the USM and VACM, which were later followed by a transport security model that provided support for SNMPv3 over SSH and SNMPv3 over TLS and DTLS.
- USM (User-based Security Model) provides authentication and privacy (encryption) functions and operates at the message level.
- VACM (View-based Access Control Model) determines whether a given principal is allowed access to a particular MIB object to perform specific functions and operates at the PDU level.
- TSM (Transport Security Model) provides a method for authenticating and encrypting messages over external security channels. Two transports, SSH and TLS/DTLS, have been defined that make use of the TSM specification.
Security has been the biggest weakness of SNMP since the beginning. Authentication in SNMP Versions 1 and 2 amounts to nothing more than a password (community string) sent in clear text between a manager and agent.
Each SNMPv3 message contains security parameters which are encoded as an octet string. The meaning of these security parameters depends on the security model being used.
SNMPv3 provides important security features:
- Confidentiality - "Encryption of packets to prevent snooping by an unauthorized source.
- Integrity - "Message integrity to ensure that a packet has not been tampered while in transit including an optional packet replay protection mechanism.
- "Authentication - to verify that the message is from a valid source.
As of 2004IETF recognizes Simple Network Management Protocol version 3 as defined by "RFC 3411–"RFC 3418 (also known as STD0062) as the current standard version of SNMP. The "IETF has designated SNMPv3 a full "Internet standard, the highest "maturity level for an RFC. It considers earlier versions to be obsolete (designating them variously "Historic" or "Obsolete").
In practice, SNMP implementations often support multiple versions: typically SNMPv1, SNMPv2c, and SNMPv3.
SNMP implementations vary across platform vendors. In some cases, SNMP is an added feature, and is not taken seriously enough to be an element of the core design. Some major equipment vendors tend to over-extend their proprietary "command line interface (CLI) centric configuration and control systems.
SNMP's seemingly simple tree structure and linear indexing may not always be understood well enough within the internal data structures that are elements of a platform's basic design. Consequently, processing SNMP queries on certain data sets may result in higher CPU utilization than necessary. One example of this would be large routing tables, such as "BGP or "IGP.
Some SNMP values (especially tabular values) require specific knowledge of table indexing schemes, and these index values are not necessarily consistent across platforms. This can cause correlation issues when fetching information from multiple devices that may not employ the same table indexing scheme (for example fetching disk utilization metrics, where a specific disk identifier is different across platforms.)
Modular devices may dynamically increase or decrease their SNMP indices (a.k.a. instances) whenever slotted hardware is added or removed. Although this is most common with hardware, virtual interfaces have the same effect. Index values are typically assigned at boot time and remain fixed until the next reboot. Hardware or virtual entities added while the device is 'live' may have their indices assigned at the end of the existing range and possibly reassigned at the next reboot. Network inventory and monitoring tools need to have the device update capability by properly reacting to the cold start trap from the device reboot in order to avoid corruption and mismatch of polled data.
Index assignments for a SNMP device instance may change from poll to poll mostly as a result of changes initiated by the system administrator. If information is needed for a particular interface, it is imperative to determine the SNMP index before retrieving the data needed. Generally, a description table like ifDescr will map a user friendly name like Serial 0/1 (Blade 0, port 1) to an SNMP index. However, this is not necessarily the case for a specific SNMP value, and can be arbitrary for an SNMP implementation.
|This section needs additional citations for "verification. (December 2015)
- SNMP versions 1 and 2c are subject to "packet sniffing of the clear text community string from the network traffic, or guessing the community strings.
- SNMP version 3 may be subject to "brute force and "dictionary attacks for guessing the authentication keys, or encryption keys, if these keys are generated from short (weak) passwords, or passwords that can be found in a dictionary. SNMPv3 allows both providing random uniformly distributed cryptographic keys, and generating cryptographic keys from password supplied by user, in which case caution is advised, and the risks are higher. The risk of guessing authentication strings is negligible, considering that for MD5- and SHA1-based authentication protocols the length of such a string is 96 bits, therefore the probability to successfully forge an authenticator is vanishingly small. Probability of finding two messages with the same authenticator is greater, but it still requires a pool of 248 valid messages to choose from, so it is not overly concerning, given the usage model (hard to accumulate that many messages for the same destination within the message lifetime of 5 minutes). With the acceptance of the HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocol for USM, risks are even lower.
A "challenge-response handshake was not used to improve security because:
- SNMPv3 (like other SNMP protocol versions) is a stateless protocol, and it has been designed with minimal amount of interactions between the agent and the manager. Thus introducing a challenge-response handshake for each command would impose a burden on the agent (and possibly on the network itself) that the protocol designers deemed excessive and unacceptable. The reader is referred here to the original SNMP book by Marshall Rose for the SNMP design criteria and rationale.
- Just like in the approach chosen by the SNMPv3 USM authentication protocol, a challenge-response approach would require shared secrets. If those secrets are cryptographically strong - then both approaches are likely to withstand an attack. And if those secrets are derived from short, guessable, or brute-force-able strings (such as weak passwords), an adversary that monitors the exchange can mount an offline attack and break the security - determine the generating short secret. There is no difference in vulnerability between SNMPv3 USM authentication and a hypothetical challenge-response: when short secrets are used - both can be broken. There are some similarities between challenge-response approaches that use keyed cryptographic one-way functions, and USM authentication protocol.
- Although SNMP works over "TCP and other protocols, it is most commonly used over "UDP that is connectionless - both for performance reasons, and to minimize the additional load on a potentially troubled network that protocols like TCP impose. The design of the Simple Network Management Protocol was optimized for repairing sick networks, rather than doing heavy things with perfectly healthy ones. Any protocol that does not use security - such as SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c - is vulnerable to "IP spoofing attacks, whether it runs over TCP or UDP, and is a subject to bypassing device access lists that might have been implemented to restrict SNMP access. SNMPv3 security mechanisms such as USM or TSM prevent a successful attack. It would be pointless to employ SNMPv3 VACM (View-based Access Control) without securing messages with USM or TSM, for the reasons given above.
- SNMP's powerful configuration (write) capabilities are not being fully utilized by many vendors, partly because of a lack of security in SNMP versions before SNMPv3, and partly because many devices simply are not capable of being configured via individual MIB object changes. Requirements of SNMP Set operation are not easy to implement correctly, and many vendors chose to omit support for Set - probably to lower their development cost and reduce the code size, among other reasons.
- SNMP tops the list of the "SANS Institute's Common Default Configuration Issues with the issue of default SNMP community strings set to ‘public’ and ‘private’ and was number ten on the SANS Top 10 Most Critical Internet Security Threats for the year 2000.
SNMP by itself is simply a protocol for collecting and organizing information about managed devices (network and device monitoring), and modifying that information on these devices, causing change in their behavior (network management). Most toolsets implementing SNMP offer some form of "discovery mechanism, a standardized collection of data common to most platforms and devices, to get a new user or implementor started. One of these features is often a form of automatic discovery, where new devices discovered in the network are polled automatically. For SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c, this presents a security risk, in that SNMP read communities will be broadcast in cleartext to the target device. SNMPv3 mitigates this risk, however it does not protect against traffic analysis and potential network topology discovery by an adversary. While security requirements and risk profiles vary from organization to organization, care should be taken when using a feature like automatic discovery, especially in mixed-tenant datacenters, server hosting and colocation facilities, and similar environments.
- "RFC 1155 (STD 16) — Structure and Identification of Management Information for the TCP/IP-based Internets
- "RFC 1156 (Historic) — Management Information Base for Network Management of TCP/IP-based internets
- "RFC 1157 (Historic) — A Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 1213 (STD 17) — Management Information Base for Network Management of TCP/IP-based internets: MIB-II
- "RFC 1452 (Informational) — Coexistence between version 1 and version 2 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework (Obsoleted by "RFC 1908)
- "RFC 1901 (Experimental) — Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2
- "RFC 1902 (Draft Standard) — Structure of Management Information for SNMPv2 (Obsoleted by "RFC 2578)
- "RFC 1908 (Standards Track) — Coexistence between Version 1 and Version 2 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework
- "RFC 2570 (Informational) — Introduction to Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework (Obsoleted by "RFC 3410)
- "RFC 2578 (STD 58) — Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)
- "RFC 3410 (Informational) — Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet Standard Management Framework
- STD 62
- "RFC 3411 — An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks
- "RFC 3412 — Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 3413 — Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications
- "RFC 3414 — User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)
- "RFC 3415 — View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 3416 — Version 2 of the Protocol Operations for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 3417 — Transport Mappings for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 3418 — Management Information Base (MIB) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 3430 (Experimental) — Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Transport Mapping
- "RFC 3584 (BCP 74) — Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework
- "RFC 3826 (Proposed) — The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm in the SNMP User-based Security Model
- "RFC 4789 (Proposed) — Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) over IEEE 802 Networks
- "RFC 5343 (STD 78) — Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Context EngineID Discovery
- "RFC 5590 (STD 78) — Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 5591 (STD 78) — Transport Security Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 5592 (Proposed) — Secure Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 5608 (Proposed) — Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) Usage for Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Transport Models.
- "RFC 6353 (STD 78) — Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- "RFC 7630 (Standards Track) — HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols in the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3
- Douglas Mauro, Kevin Schmidt (2005). Essential SNMP, Second Edition. O'Reilly Media. p. 462. "ISBN "0596008406.
- William Stallings (1999). SNMP, SNMPv2, SNMPv3, and RMON 1 and 2. Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. p. 619. "ISBN "0201485346.